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                ABSTRACT 
Before remarking on “The New Science of the Mind”, I first offer some comments on philosophy and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), 
Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social 
World (MSW) and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order 
behavior, not found in psychology nor philosophy, that I will refer to as the WS framework. 
 
As with so many philosophy books, we might stop with the title. As the quotes and comments above and in my 
other reviews and the books they cover indicate, there are compelling reasons for regarding the problems we face 
in describing the psychology of higher order thought as conceptual and not scientific. This ought to be crystal clear 
to all, but science envy and almost complete oblivion to WSH etc. is a la mode! But as H notes above, the issues 
discussed here are all about language games and have nothing to do with science. In fact, as usual, if one translates 
into plain English there is very little of interest here, and certainly nothing not said before and better by WS etc. 
countless times since the 30’s (see e.g., The Blue and Brown Books from 1933-35). It is not surprising that he 
makes no significant references to any of the above books or persons (the only reference to S is an article from 
1958!), though in my view they are at the top of the list of the major figures in descriptive psychology. 
 
On p119 he tells us that the key to all this is to figure out how “…a personal level cognitive process can belong to a 
representational subject. This is the task of the second half of the book.” But W did this 80 years ago and since we 
have the beautifully clear explanations of WSH, H&M etc., there is no point to torturing oneself with the rather 
aimless and opaque prose that veers off at the end into Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl, and Frege, with a dash of 
postmodernist word salad for good measure.  A valiant effort on an interesting topic, but ultimately exhausting 
and fruitless. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view 
may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those 
interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature 
and the Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"; its state is not 
comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of 
mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the 
other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us 
think we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another 
by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and 
answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness.”(Blue Book p18, 1933).    
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am 
satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false." 
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open 
before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical 
Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds to (is the translation 
of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology because 
they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of 
meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle 
PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions of satisfaction. And a 
proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to 
determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC 
p193 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by identifying a pattern which it shares 
with its computational simulation, because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further causal powers is 
fatal to the claim that programs provide causal explanations of cognition... There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." Searle Philosophy in a New 
Century(PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science is at much too high a level of 
abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference 
by the fact that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record both the visual 
intentionality and the output of the computational model of vision...in the sense of `information' used in cognitive 
science, it is simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose that every mental 
representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is 
characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the 
structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: the 
difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something 
that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything.---Not anything that follows from 
this, no this itself is the solution!....This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell 
upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) are an outline of behavior 
(human nature) from our two greatest descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in 
mind that philosophy is descriptive psychology.  
 
Before remarking on “The New Science of the Mind”, I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), 
Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social 
World (MSW) and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order 
behavior, not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. To serve as an heuristic 
framework I have generated a table which is very useful but no room here (see other reviews such as that of 
Shoemaker’s Physical Realization). 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: “Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep 
problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems 
about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between thought and language, about 
solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth 
and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave 
us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn 
centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He undermined foundationalist 
epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to 
human understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual confusions into which 
we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe the two systems of thought--fast 
automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is 
possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be doubted or judged, 
so will (choice), consciousness self, time and space are innate true-only axioms.  He noted in thousands of pages 
and hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not directly describable in language, this being 
possible only with terms that substitute for public behavior (the impossibility of private language).  He  invented 
truth tables and predicted the utility of paraconsistent logic. He patented helicopter designs which anticipated by 
three decades the use of blade-tip jets to drive the rotors and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas 
turbine engine, designed a heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a modernist house, and 
sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently completed by others.   He can be viewed as the first 
evolutionary psychologist since he constantly explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated 
how it generates behavior. He described the psychology behind the Wason test--a fundamental measure used in 
EP decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. He 
described and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and the computational theory of mind, long before 
practical computers. He decisively laid to rest skepticism and metaphysics. He showed that, far from being 
inscrutable, the activities of the mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since.  
In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive psychology, philosophers rarely specify 
exactly what it is that they expect to contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, 
so after noting W’s above remark on science envy, I will quote again from Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further condition …, or whether 
knowledge does not even imply belief ... We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said that he knows something. Is it a 
distinctive mental state, an achievement, a performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing 
that p be identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but it is not the case that p’, 
whereas one cannot say ‘I believe that p, but it is not the case that p’? Why are there ways, methods and means of 
achieving, attaining or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one know, but not 
believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, 
passionately, hesitantly, foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but 
not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on – through many hundreds of similar 
questions pertaining not only to knowledge and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, 
observing, noticing,  recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to mention the numerous 
verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web 
of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various forms of their 
compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context 
dependency. To this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and 
self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-
de-sac- p15-2005) 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically programmed 
automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast 
S1 and slow S2 thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions or abilities to act), but the logical 
extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior due to the recent 
evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non-
propositional, prelinguistic mental states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 
Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described 
causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, 
slow thinking, mentalizing neurons.  That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 
(joyfulness, loving, hating)-- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, 
knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to 
describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker 
etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but graduating into everyday 
uses) which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate 
axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Referential (CSR), and the S2 use, 
which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my 
way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and other disciplines under names like 
"cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so 
there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur without 
involving much of the intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology 
(EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 
which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural 
deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and 
Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on 
pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are caused by the automatic 
functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things 
to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--desires time shifted and 
decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, 
are totally dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive 
S1. In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) 
or remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the 
future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated 
seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we consciously 
control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as 
`The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary psychology, that `will', `self' and `consciousness' are 
axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous 
times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) 
has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is 
axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic 
intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean that 
skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be 
possible. As W showed countless times and biology demonstrates, life must be based on certainty--automated 
unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no 
people, no philosophy. 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (need to 
alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced 
in space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle 
movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." 
And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the paradox is that 
the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the 
short term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, 
but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to 
help the poor because it is right but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the 
inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give 
rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces 
reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The 
overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and 
Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of 
which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that 
this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the 
comment from W: " When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought 
is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus W's lovely aphorisms (p132 
Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W 
can usually be translated as `EP' and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this 
is about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes that there is a general way to 
characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions 
of satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well formed sentence in a context that can be true or false and 
this is an act and not a mental state. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the whole problem 
of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it 
lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I 
know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing 
does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it 
were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know."  
Disposition words refer to Potential Events which I accept as fulfilling the COS and my mental states, emotions, 
change of interest etc. have no bearing on the way dispositions function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, 
intending, desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I express and which can only 
be expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
This is another statement of W’s argument against private language. Likewise with rule following and 
interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable acts. And one must note that many (most famously Kripke) 
miss the boat here, being misled by W's frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it's just arbitrary 
public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W makes clear many times that such conventions 
are only possible given an innate shared axiomatic psychology which he often calls the background. 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are as clear as day—we must have a test to 
differentiate between A and B and tests can only be public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the 
Box’. I have explained the functioning of dispositional language (‘propositional attitudes’) and W’s dismantling of 
the notion of introspection above and in my reviews of Budd, Johnston and several of S’s books.  Basically he 
showed that the causal relation and word and object model that works for S1 does not apply to S2. 
W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his work is devoted to describing why it cannot serve as a 
description of behavior. “Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that 
everything except human behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI 
p307) But real behaviorism is rampant in its modern ‘functionalist’, ‘computationalist’,’dynamic systems’ forms.  
See my review of Carruther’s ‘The Opacity of Mind’ for a recent egregious example.  
Behaviorism etc. have no practical impact.  Unlike other cartoon views of life, they are too cerebral and esoteric to 
be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so unrealistic that even its adherents totally ignore it in their 
everyday life.  Unfortunately not so with other cartoon theories like SSSM, BS and TPI, widely shared by religions, 
governments, sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, history, literature, and mom and dad, in spite of well 
known facts, such as that personalities of adults adopted as children are as different from those of their adoptive 
siblings and parents as people chosen randomly off the street.  Religions big and small, political movements, and 
economics often generate or embrace already existing cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human nature), 
posit forces terrestrial or cosmic that reinforce our superstitions, wishful thinking and selfishness and help to 
accelerate the destruction of the earth (the real purpose of nearly every social practice).  The point is to realize 
that these fantasies are on a continuum and have the same source. All of us are born with a cartoon view of life 
and few ever grow out of it.  But the world is not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the cartoons 
collide with reality. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a century in the 
case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral 
science texts and commonly there is barely a mention.  
Now for some comments on “The New Science of the Mind” (NSM).  
As with so many philosophy books, we might stop with the title.  As the quotes and comments above and in my 
other reviews and the books they cover indicate, there are compelling reasons for regarding the problems we face 
in describing the psychology of higher order thought as conceptual and not scientific. This ought to be crystal clear 
to all, but science envy and almost complete oblivion to WSH etc. is a la mode! But as H notes above, the issues 
discussed here are all about language games and have nothing to do with science. In fact, as usual, if one translates 
into plain English there is very little of interest here, and certainly nothing not said before and better by WS etc. 
countless times since the 30’s (see e.g., The Blue and Brown Books from 1933-35—if you don’t see the connection 
with all this try harder). It is not surprising that he makes no significant references to any of the above books or 
persons (the only reference to S is an article from 1958!), though in my view they are at the top of the list of the 
major figures in descriptive psychology.    
Rowland wants to discern the precise roles of the 4 E ‘aspects’ of mind (Enactive, Embodied, Embedded, Extended 
see p3) with the aim to show that he can combine the Extended and Embodied into the Amalgamated to yield a 
clear theory of mind.  Recall that W insisted that the activities of the mind lie open before us and theories or 
theses must be replaced by descriptions.  
Some sections of the book are reasonably successful at describing the nonsense that passes as philosophy of mind 
but there is much aimless wandering and many mistakes and confusions, all couched in infelicitous jargon. This will 
hopefully be obvious to those who read the above and my other reviews as I cannot record more than a few of the 
comments I made in my two readings of this book. Major flaws, common to most writing in the behavioral 
sciences, are the lack of awareness of the S1/S2 two selves mode of describing personality that W pioneered 
(though nobody has noticed), the partial(or perhaps complete) embracing of the mechanical view of mind, and a 
failure to be clear about nature/nuture issues which the 4 E’s seem eager to fuse. The fast automatic perceptions, 
‘rules’ and behaviors of S1 are mushed together with the slow conscious dispositional thinking, believing and rule 
following of S2 and neither are clearly or consistently distinguished from the arbitrary cultural behaviors of S3.  
Thus he is severely limited by failing to note clearly the difference between the automatic unconscious ‘rules’ of S1 
perception and reflexive actions and the deliberate conscious ‘rules’ of S2 thinking and understanding, both innate, 
and the arbitrary learned S3 rules that constitute the cultural veneer on behavior. S2 rule following is just 
dispositional behavior of understanding propositions with COS. He says things somewhat like this (e.g., see p116, 
but not in clear and consistent terms and I doubt many will be able to wade thru it with any good results.   
It fails anywhere to make it clear that thinking, believing etc. are dispositions, hence propositional and true or false 
S2 functions and, like all dispositions, have clear meaning due to their public outer Conditions of Satisfaction and 
not to any private internal phenomena. This is another demonstration of the impossibility of private language and 
introspection and contrary to its supposed complexity, it is a simple fact that there can be no such thing as a 
private test to determine the truth of any statement. This is the major topic of the fine books by Budd and 
Johnston—the Inner phenomena that we experience vs the Outer behavior that constitutes language and social 
interaction. That is why this can be seen as a poor man’s version of W’s Inner and Outer watered down and 
smothered in jargon. If one thinks that where there’s smoke, there’s fire, then please see Hutto and Myin’s book 
for a razor sharp account of the 4 E’s but someone who understands the critical need to differentiate the various 
LG’s of ‘information’, ‘representation’, ‘content’ etc. and why none of these can be part of S1. Yes the brain can 
only express itself via the muscles of mouth, arms and legs and yes it is thus unavoidable that S2 dispositions can 
only be manifested in public acts like speech and movement—that is, in the WS framework they have Conditions 
of Satisfaction (COS). “I am driving to Ohio” has to be said and heard and yes it needs a car, a road and the 
cognitive act of driving and if you like you can call these these external embodiments, enactive, embedded or 
extended aspects of mind, but exactly what is achieved? It is the most trivial of truisms that our mind needs a brain 
and the brain a body and the body a world but what is useful about including the car, the gas, the engine, the road 
and Ohio as part of cognition? Yes in some sense they are all signs or creations of intentionality since created by 
us, but how about the trees, birds and clouds? Only theists could be happy with that. We inherit our genes, 
biochemistry, physiology, anatomy and abilities (e.g., dispositions such as thinking) but not the car in any useful 
sense and certainly not the clouds, and isn’t this the crucial thing? The 4 E’s and Rowlands’ Amalgamated Mind 
seem to want to fuse dispositions with intentions and actions and results and the world (see p127-129) and look a 
lot like back door attempts to merge nature and nurture, a return to blank slateism and TPI. Not a happy ending. 
W destroyed the mechanical or reductionist, computationalist, behaviorist, functionalist, Strong AI view of mind 
(yes they seem to be different, but the mistakes are pretty much the same) and for those who didn’t get it, S, H 
and many others carried on. Nevertheless, these incoherencies continue to dominate cognitive science and 
philosophy. Rowlands says he will mostly avoid functionalism, yet if he realized its bankruptcy why bring it up again 
and again, and he tells us p103 that the extended mind (one of the two pillars of his theory) is “predicated on a 
liberal conception of functionalism” and in detail on p100 and 104 how they go hand in hand.  
Rowlands’ discussion of cognitive bloat (p128 etc.) makes reference to S’s “underived” content but his only ref to 
S’s work is over 50 years old. Since then S has called this “intrinsic intentionality” that includes all of S1 and S2 (i.e., 
all cognition) and which contrasts with “derived” or “ascribed” which is ascribed by us to machines and other 
artifacts and events and is of course NOT intentionality (cognition or psychology). In this sense animals have only 
intrinsic and not ascribed intentionality. But he seems to get this sense of derived mixed up with his sense in which 
it refers to the personal level S2, as opposed to the nonderived or subpersonal level S1 (see p117-19). If you want 
to be really serious about your laptop being asleep and awake, and the car and the road being part of the mind, 
then cognition will extend into the universe, at least when doing philosophy, but it will not in this sense (except 
maybe in bizarre, rare, amusing or quite scary cases) enter into nor have any impact at all on real life. So for me 
the 4 E’s as presented here are just more cartoon views of life.  
In contrast, the almost mathematically precise Radical Enactivism of Hutto and Myin only insists on the fact that S1 
blends into the world as our perceptions, memories and reflex actions are automatic, unconscious, prelinguistic, 
contentless,  informationless and without representation. Only the slow, conscious S2 dispositions fed by S1 have 
information, content and representation (COS). If you insist to apply these terms to S1 as well then please 
differentiate I1,C1,R1, COS1 etc from I2, C2, R2, COS2 etc. for reasons I have mentioned above and in many other 
reviews.  
On p119 he tells us that the key to all this is to figure out how “…a personal level cognitive process can belong to a 
representational subject. This is the task of the second half of the book.” But W did this 80 years ago and since we 
have the beautifully clear explanations of WSH,H&M etc., there is no point to torturing oneself with the rather 
aimless and opaque prose that veers off at the end into Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl, and Frege, with a dash of 
postmodernist word salad for good measure. 
 A valiant effort on an interesting topic, but ultimately exhausting and fruitless.  
 
   
